Introduction
In 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrated its fortieth birthday. The original founding members*Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand*have subsequently been joined by Brunei Darussalam (1984) , Vietnam (1995) , Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), Myanmar (Burma) (July 1997), and Cambodia (April 1999) . From a small fivestate security community, ASEAN now comprises an association with a combined population of 600 million and a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$1 trillion, and generates annual trade flows in excess of US$900 million. Despite its 'middle-age' milestone, however, ASEAN's achievements remain the subject of intense debate, as does its role and relevance to a region experiencing rapid change in its economic, social and political composition. Indeed, despite its commitment to realising economic integration via the 'free flow of goods, services, investment, and a freer flow of capital', evidence of deeper economic engagement remains problematic. 1 This article explores ASEAN's cooperative endeavours in one such area: investment liberalisation. Investment liberalisation is variously associated with net positive effects on inflows of investment capital, technology transfer, employment, export generation, economic growth and development (see UNCTAD 2003: 87Á8; see also Quazi 2007) . As a net historical beneficiary of investment flows, the article hypothesises that ASEAN's stated commitment to investment liberalisation should by now be realising progress in each of four areas: (1) absolute reductions in national autonomy in relation to investment screening and conditionality provisions; (2) increased transparency in respect of member states' national investment regimes; (3) enhanced standardisation and codification of regulatory standards governing investment-related provisions across member states; and (4) enhanced centralised coordination and decisionmaking in respect of investment governance. Each of these areas is investigated in relation to ASEAN's three primary investment agreements and the ensuing regimes that govern investment provisions and policy practices among member states.
ASEAN's investment regime: the architecture
Foreign investment has been the lifeblood of ASEAN's economies. Where goes foreign direct investment (FDI), so goes growth. As Figure 1 indicates, foreign investment is correlated strongly to economic performance and export activity, and is responsible for an increasing share of gross fixed capital formation (Sakakibara and Yamakawa 2003: 18Á9) . Investment promotion has thus been a key policy instrument used by all member states to steer investment into strategic sectors that complement national comparative advantage, and promote export activity and employment generation. Recognising the strategic importance of investment to development, ASEAN was one of the first regional groups in the South to adopt formal instruments that promote and protect cross-border investment among nationals of member states. These have comprised two sequentially related agreements, which together define the policy architecture of ASEAN's investment regime: the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (AAPPI; 1987 , 1996 and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) agreement (1998; amended 2001) .
While each is a formal instrument that speaks to the legal obligations of member states, equally they embody the political aspirations of ASEAN heads of government and their stated commitment to grow intra-ASEAN investment as a proportion of total investment flows to the region; facilitate greater ease of movement of capital, technology and knowledge skills; and thus promote equitable development among member states as a means of achieving longerterm economic integration through enhancing economic complementarities (ASEAN Secretariat 1987b: Point 29) . Much of the weight of ASEAN's success and/or failure thus rests on the efficacy of these agreements and the outcomes they realise.
The ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (AAPPI)
Adopted in 1987 at the ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting in Manila, the AAPPI (ASEAN Secretariat 1987a) represents the culmination of a decade-long series of negotiations and ASEAN's first multilateral endeavour at enhancing investment cooperation. Its importance lies not just in the architecture it sets in place and from which would evolve ASEAN's contemporary investment regime, but also the procedural, cooperative, consultative and dispute processes and procedures that would arise and largely embed themselves in ASEAN's 
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Downloaded by [NUS National University of Singapore] at 19:43 01 April 2012 subsequent investment agreements. 2 The AAPPI thus casts a long shadow over ASEAN's investment regime and the ensuing character of the association's liberalisation efforts.
Despite the foundational importance of the AAPPI, the agreement itself is remarkably parsimonious. The protocols of the agreement are confined to three substantive areas: (1) stipulation of investor treatment; (2) investor protections and compensation; and (3) disputation mechanisms.
The first of these provisions aspire to a broad set of minimum standards that define the treatment of ASEAN nationals by specifying a 'fair and equitable' treatment clause (ASEAN Secretariat 1987a: Article IV), and stipulating that this cannot be less than that granted to investors accorded MFN (most favoured nation) status. Ostensibly, the intent is to discourage discrimination between ASEAN nationals, while ensuring them treatment equivalent to MFN status. Further, Article IV stipulates that ASEAN nationals will receive protections in accord with those afforded a host country's own nationals: 'each contracting party shall, within its territory ensure full protection of the investments made in accordance with its legislation' and these 'shall not impair by unjustified or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, extension, disposition or liquidation of such investments' (Article IV.1). Judicial, political or legislative measures that unfairly discriminate against investment from ASEAN nationals are therefore prohibited. This equivalency clause is also extended to the treatment of ASEAN nationals in the event of damages due to hostilities or a state of national emergency (Article IV.3). The clause, however, does not guarantee compensation or restitution, and is not intended as an instrument of investor indemnity against civil unrest or political risk.
The second of the provisions in the agreement address investor protections. Two sets of protections are identified: the repatriation of capital, earnings and compensation in the case of expropriation. The former affirms the right of repatriation for all business activities associated with the remittance of net profits, dividends, royalties, interest, dispossession of assets and capital transfers by ASEAN nationals. Article VII also includes the repatriation of proceeds through liquidation of assets, earnings accruing to employees and remittance of all forms of debt settlement by ASEAN nationals. The second of the clauses provides investor indemnity in the case of expropriation by providing ASEAN investors with recourse to compensation at fair market values prevailing 'immediately before the measure of dispossession became public knowledge', access to compensation monies 'without unreasonable delay', and commits signatories to assure the transferability of compensation monies in freely usable currencies (Article VI.1).
Third, and finally, the AAPPI specifies disputation mechanisms in the case of disagreement between contracting parties covered by the agreement. Two sets of disputation mechanisms are incorporated into the agreement. The first is a defined arbitration mechanism that allows disputing parties to seek arbitration in specified international arbitration centres.
3 While the agreement makes the disputation mechanisms binding on the extant party and vests in the arbitration court a 'binding authority' clause, no enforcement mechanism is specified. Partly, this is accommodated in a second default mechanism that refers intransigent disputes to the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) Meeting, vesting in the AEM ultimate decision-making authority.
Assessing the impact and outcomes of the AAPPI
As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, the AAPPI has fallen short of its original intent to propel the expansion of intra-ASEAN investment 'to at least ten per cent of total foreign investments by the turn of the century', with the level of intraregional investment remaining stubbornly static*not only in dollar terms, but also as a percentage of total capital flows to the region (ASEAN Secretariat 1987b: Point 29). As late as 2005, for example, intra-ASEAN investment accounted for less than 10 percent of total FDI inflows. While there are countless factors that impact investment flows, making it hard to apportion causality or correlate variables with any degree of accuracy, the evidence suggesting a positive impact of the AAPPI is hard to discern. Part of this reflects the limited and circumscribed nature of the agreement itself, and part the structural flaws in the agreement which fail to address underlying issues associated with investment regime transparency or the removal of national barriers to investment entry. More obviously, the agreement also reveals fundamental tensions between, on the one hand, the intent to create standards of equivalency in the treatment of ASEAN nationals while, on the other, preserving national autonomy over investment policy. These conflicting agendas doubtlessly contributed both to the protracted decade-long negotiations leading to the adoption of the agreement and its problematic impact on intra-ASEAN investment flows. 4 
Tensions and contradictions: nationalism versus regionalism
The obvious shortcoming of the agreement lies in its inability to effectively negotiate a mechanism to decouple competitive national investment agendas from broader objectives aimed at creating region-wide standards in the entry and treatment privileges afforded to ASEAN nationals. Specifically, the failure of the agreement to identify a regional mechanism to protect developing domestic industries from parallel, competitive ASEAN investments condemned the agreement to its current form*one that essentially enshrines national autonomy in respect of investment policy and investor treatment. The agreement, for example, affirms the centrality of autonomous national screening processes, allowing member states to leave untouched national requirements for investors to obtain written host-government approval or to impose registration and annual renewal requirements on foreign investment. So, too, the AAPPI does not limit the conditionality rights of member states, allowing Foreign direct investment and investment liberalisation in Asia 227 (2003b, 2006, 2009a) . them to impose point-of-entry and operating conditions on investments or to discriminate through various tax, concessional or incentive systems as a means of directing or selecting investments deemed to be beneficial to the host country. Importantly, this preserves the ability of member states to screen foreign investment and to shelter domestic investment from intra-regional investment competition. In short, the agreement does not grant investors a right of entry to member states, but speaks more generally to post-entry standards of treatment, once approval for the investment has been given by the host country. Even in the case of post-entry standards of treatment, however, the AAPPI tends to preserve national discretionary autonomy, allowing states to withhold or confer national treatment to foreign investors on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, there is an obvious tension in the agreement between clauses stipulating equivalency standards in the treatment of ASEAN nationals and broad exclusion clauses that seek to limit the scope of equivalency treatment. Article IV.4 (ASEAN Secretariat 1987a), for example, notes that 'any two or more of the contracting parties may negotiate to accord national treatment', but further adds that 'nothing herein shall entitle any other party to claim national treatment under the most-favored national principle' (my emphasis). Clearly, signatories to the agreement were not willing to grant national treatment even to ASEAN investors, except on a case-by-case basis and subject to host-country approval (Thanadsillapakul 2001) . This provides signatory states with the latitude to specify modes of treatment or impose limitations on foreign investors as deemed appropriate. More obviously, making this clause beyond the scope of MFN consideration preserves the ability of member states to maintain a dual investment regime able to discriminate between domestic and foreign investors.
If examined closely, the AAPPI even preserves member state discretion in respect of rights to expropriate foreign invested assets. Article VI.1, for example, allows states to invoke a 'public use, or public purpose, or . . . public interest' clause in the case of state expropriation, only stipulating a 'fair market value' compensation clause. Missing from the agreement, however, is any definitional clarity as to what constitutes 'public use' or 'public purpose', presupposing that member states may invoke this clause unchallenged, or at least absent a mechanism to effectively investigate the rectitude of the action itself. It also precludes any legal challenge to an act of 'public use' expropriation by an ASEAN investor, privileging the actions of the member state and guaranteeing state discretion. And while compensation is guaranteed to ASEAN nationals in the case of expropriation, the technical means via which 'fair market' value is to be determined or the appeal mechanism available to the investor to challenge this remain opaque*as do the compliance and enforcement mechanisms available to the investor.
This, perhaps, is the most telling omission in the agreement: the absence of rule-based dispute settlement procedures for foreign investors and the failure to vest ultimate decision-making authority in a non-political, non-partisan body. By default, the AEM have ultimate juridical authority over disputes. This makes dispute settlement a process of protracted political and bureaucratic negotiation, and obfuscates the use of rule-based processes informed by technical, objective assessment criteria. The effectiveness of the investment guarantees and their availability to ASEAN investors is thus rendered problematic (Greenwalk 2006: 202Á9) .
Finally, the AAPPI leaves untouched issues associated with the transparency of the investment regime or the standardisation and formal codification of the regulatory regime responsible for oversight and governance of investment. Under the auspices of the AAPPI, for example, even the development of a centralised ASEAN repository providing information about the regulatory standards and compliance protocols for investors proved unfruitful. As before, navigating the rules concerning the entry and operational compliance obligations of investors continued to rest with national authorities and be defined by non-uniform national standards.
The AAPPI: the 1996 emendations
Despite the shortcomings of the agreement and its problematic impact on intra-ASEAN investment flows, the AAPPI operated for nearly a decade before emendations were ratified in 1996. These were triggered, in part, by the accession of Vietnam to full membership of the association (July 1995) and, in part, by perceptions about the veracity of the agreement and the need to quicken the pace of investment cooperation. Two substantive emendations were incorporated into the amended agreement. Article 3 related to issues of transparency and 'predictability' of investment laws, and Article 4 to dispute settlement mechanisms (ASEAN Secretariat 1996b).
5 Article 3, in particular, spoke to the lack of investment transparency that by 1996 warranted deliberative corrective measures. More generally, the haphazard and superficial level of investment coordination under the AAPPI had been visceral and an issue increasingly raised at ASEAN ministerial meetings. The Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 1993, for example, highlighted concerns about the apparent international trend towards deeper regionalism and coordination in blocs like the European Union and North American Free Trade Agreement, while intimating that similar developments would need to be realised in ASEAN if growth trajectories were to be sustained. Similarly, by the time of the AEM Meeting in Brunei in September 1995, there was a general sense of urgency with regard to speeding up trade and investment liberalisation, and that ASEAN would need 'to move faster' (see ASEAN Secretariat 1993 , 1995b . Article 2 of the amended AAPPI thus urged members to 'endeavour to simplify and streamline their investment procedures and approval processes [in order] to facilitate investment flows', and it was further stipulated in Article 3 that:
Each contracting party shall ensure the provision of up-to-date information on all laws and regulations pertaining to foreign investment in its territory Foreign direct investment and investment liberalisation in Asia 231 and shall take appropriate measures to ensure that such information be made as transparent, timely and publicly assessable as possible (ASEAN Secretariat 1996b).
These emendations, however, continued to reaffirm the tacit reification of national standards in setting investment policy, while appealing to member states to enhance the level of transparency of their investment regimes. In a sense, the pretext of cooperative, regionally based investment protocols that the AAPPI was meant to harbor was set aside. By and large, the agreement now became a more explicit aspirational statement of goals concerning investment cooperation, and appeals to members to codify, simplify and publish their investment laws in a manner that would make them more transparent and accessible to ASEAN nationals.
The one area where progress did appear to be gaining traction concerned the development of the Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ASEAN Secretariat 1996a), which Article 4 of the amended AAPPI noted would henceforth apply to the settlement of disputes. While notionally a move towards initiating a rules-based dispute settlement system and attempting to decouple dispute procedures from political-cum-bureaucratic negotiation, the Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism remained in limbo for several years and was never ratified. The then ASEAN Secretary General, Ong Keng Yong, explained the failure to immediately ratify the protocol on perceptions that it was 'ineffective because of its excessive bureaucratic nature' (quoted in Greenwalk 2006: 207) .
6
The AAPPI: triumph of nationalism over regionalism?
In terms of the four criteria outlined at the commencement of this article, the AAPPI (1987 AAPPI ( , 1996 obviously fails on each. The AAPPI preserves the ability of member states to engage in competitive investment promotional measures and investment screening, and to impose conditionality clauses on the operational parameters of foreign investment in the context of a dual investment regime. Its impact should thus be assessed in terms of a circumscribed set of minimum standards defining compensation, restitution and repatriation principles that provide government guarantees to ASEAN nations in terms of the transfer of capital, profits, earnings and debt settlement. It is, in this sense, ASEAN's introductory foray aimed at mitigating the most obvious forms of political risk for ASEAN nationals, while preserving the juridical sanctity of domestic-based investment regimes and state autonomy in respect of foreign investment policy (the major features of the APPI are summarized in Table 3 ).
The ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) agreement
The AIA agreement is the most comprehensive statement made by ASEAN on investment liberalisation to date (see ASEAN Secretariat 1998a; see also ASEAN Secretariat 2001) . Ratified in October 1998 and amended in 2001, the AIA agreement embodies a series of 'schemes, action plans, and specific programs' that define the contemporary contours of ASEAN's investment regime (ASEAN Secretariat 1998b: 3) . Its coverage extends to various forms of FDI, excluding portfolio investment or investment pertaining to matters falling under the ASEAN Agreement on Services (see ASEAN Secretariat 1995a; 2003c) .
The key instruments in the agreement are contained in Article 7 and cover four main areas. The first aims at an immediate liberalisation of all 'industries for investments by ASEAN investors', except for sectors listed on a temporary exclusion list (TEL) or sensitive list (SL). The second sets in place a 'national treatment' clause in respect of 'all industries and measures affecting investment . . . the admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, operation and disposition of investments'. The third pillar specifies the procedural mechanisms in respect of sector/industry nomination for the inclusion of sectors on the TELs and SLs. In addition, Article 7 sets in place a timeline for the phaseout of the TELs (2010), except for Lao PDR, Vietnam (2013) and Myanmar (2015) . Article 7 also stipulates procedures for the recurrent review of the TELs and SLs via a newly formed ministerial-level AIA Council responsible for Table 3 . Major features of the AAPPI (1987 AAPPI ( , 1996 
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oversight, coordination and implementation of the AIA agreement among member states (Kee and Mirza 2004: 209) . Finally, and notably, the AIA agreement provides the first tangible set of provisions for improving investment transparency among member states, stipulating procedural mechanisms and reporting requirements for signatories concerning the rules, regulations and ordinances governing investment provisions and which impact the AIA agreement. These also extend to bilateral investment agreements entered into by member states with a requirement to disclose 'promptly and at least annually' changes to the regulatory provisions governing investment (ASEAN Secretariat 1998a: Article 11). Subsequent emendations to the agreement in September 2001 did not alter the tenor of the agreement, but did stipulate its specific coverage. Where the original AIA agreement specified all industries, the amended protocol stipulated sector coverage exclusive to direct investments and services incidental to: The AIA agreement and investment liberalisation: fact or fiction?
Despite being the most comprehensive agreement on investment liberalisation produced by ASEAN, the AIA agreement also highlights a series of tensions concerning nationalist economic protectionism and growth objectives, and broader philosophical debates about the role of state sponsorship in the promotion of domestic multinational enterprise. Set amid a backdrop of regional economic turmoil and financial crises, the ratification of the agreement in 1998 betrayed concerns over the ability of ASEAN member states to continue to attract large inflows of FDI, maintain growth and employment, and quell increasing levels of political discontent. While the negotiations leading to the adoption of the AIA agreement preceded the regional financial crisis, the speed of its adoption and the unilateral implementation of various measures contained in the agreement prior to its formal ratification reveal an environment fraught with anxiety. Malaysia, for example, strongly supported the AIA agreement, but principally as a means of nurturing domestic Malaysian capital, whereby ASEAN's regional market would provide the economies of scale and testing ground for Malaysian enterprise to launch onto the world stage. Indonesia, too, saw the AIA agreement as a means of forging 'ASEAN conglomerates' by privileging ASEAN investors over other foreign direct investors. One senior official in the ASEAN Secretariat, for example, noted that ASEAN 'saw the need to develop regional multinational corporations (MNCs) using the grace period [clause] before foreign investors would be accorded the same privileges' (Nesadurai 2003: 113) . Rather than being conceived strictly as a means of investment liberalisation, the AIA agreement was instead embraced as a means of protecting and advantaging regional enterprise in readiness to compete with Western multinational conglomerates. At one and the same time, the AIA agreement thus represents a medium for investment liberalisation and regional protectionism.
These competing policy concerns explain the contradictions evident in the various articles of the AIA agreement. The instigation of a coordinating authority in the form of an AIA Council, for example, marked a significant step forward in institutionalising investment coordination as a central pillar of ASEAN's 2020 vision to develop an economic community. More obviously, it reflected the previous haphazard approaches to investment facilitation and policy coordination/implementation, much of which had been left to national discretion and the pitfalls of dissimilar national institutional capacity. In adopting the AIA agreement and the institutional architecture of the AIA Council, ASEAN members signalled their intention to get serious about policy coordination and investment policy harmonisation, and to make more transparent their national investment regimes. Indeed, the ministerial-level AIA Council moved quickly to institutionalise its processes, forming a Coordinating Committee on Investment, meeting four to five times a year in order to oversee policy coordination and implementation, discuss regional investment matters and coordinate investment promotion. Likewise, the instigation under the auspices of the AIA Council of a Working Group on Foreign Direct Investment Statistics marked, for the first time, the adoption of formal procedural mechanisms in order to harmonise FDI data collection and measurement, and thus provide annualised comparative regional FDI data to the AIA Council and policy planners (Kee and Mirza 2004: 209) .
While the AIA agreement marks a significant advance in terms of the institutional environment governing intra-regional investment, the articles of the agreement and their impact on investment liberalisation are more problematic. For example, while the AIA agreement accelerated the phase-out schedule for the TELs (2003 for ASEAN 6 and 2010 for Vietnam, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Myanmar), it left indefinite the phase-out period for the SLs, allowing national discretion in the nomination of sectors to the list and only suggesting that this would be periodically reviewed via the AIA Council. Likewise, the commitment of member states to intra-ASEAN investment liberalisation seemed to wane as the regional financial crisis subsided. Article 1 of the 2001 Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area, for example, seemed to step back from a default blanket clause covering 'all' industries, to a more exclusionist language covering only named sectors (the manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry, and mining and quarrying sectors). That the intent was to circumscribe coverage is revealed in Article 1.3, which states that the 'agreement shall further cover direct investments in such other sectors and services incidental to such sectors as may be agreed upon by all Member States'. What remains unnamed in the AIA agreement thus speaks strongly to the inability of ASEAN to address intra-regional investment liberalisation in Foreign direct investment and investment liberalisation in Asia 235 strategic sectors like telecommunications, financial services, infrastructure, transportation or print and electronic broadcast media, where national conditionality clauses and protectionist restrictions remain strong (ASEAN Secretariat 2001).
The impact of the AIA agreement is also problematic in terms of its stated achievements to roll back closed or restricted sectors to foreign investment, or quicken progress in removing or delisting sectors from the TELs and SLs. Indeed, there is ample evidence to suggest that investment protectionism or sectoral sheltering persists among many ASEAN states. As Appendices A and B highlight, for example, the TELs and SLs for various countries continue to be populated by numerous industry sectors where investment is either prohibited or subject to stringent conditionality clauses limiting investment access. Likewise, the TELs and SLs for services incidental to the manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry, and mining and quarrying sectors (Appendix B) also continue to be heavily populated or subject to stringent conditionality requirements, including ceilings on foreign equity participation, joint venture requirements, forced governmentÁbusiness cooperation contracts, directed sourcing requirements, domestic market access restrictions, export-only clauses, stipulated land use provisions, or various approvals or screening requirements that place discretionary authority for investment approval in the hands of regional and local agencies*many of which have stipulated non-dislocation clauses to local populations as part of their approval requirement processes. In the case of the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Lao PDR, for example, the sectoral inclusion and conditionality clauses restrict investment access, which affects domestic small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the manufacturing, forestry, fishery, agriculture and mining sectors. Equally, the retailing, food and beverage processing/manufacturing, construction and allied services, electronic component manufacturing, hospitality, and hotel and tourism sectors are all typically restricted or prohibited on the basis of being 'reserved for domestic SMEs'. Far from an open investment regime, many of ASEAN's member states continue to utilise protectionist measures, despite the stated ambitions of the AIA agreement.
The TELs and SLs, however, do not betray the full extent to which investment screening and tacit investment protectionism persist among ASEAN states. Two factors would seem to be at work in this regard. First, regional political pressures and the need to 'keep up appearances' in terms of moving the AIA agreement forward and achieving aspirational targets are doubtlessly leading to the underreporting of investment conditionality clauses and restrictions. While the ASEAN Secretariat thus dutifully carries the TELs and SLs provided by member states, when cross-checked against the investment stipulations required at point of entry by the relevant national authorities, wide discrepancy appears to exist between the stated restrictions and the conditionality requirements listed with the ASEAN Secretariat. Second, the compliance requirements stipulated by the AIA agreement in terms of the phasing out of the Similar trends are also apparent in the case of Malaysia and Thailand, which no longer publish a TEL and claim 'nil' inclusion in terms of prohibited sectors, but where the SL has been modified to include a series of increasing conditionality clauses that range from restricted geographic zones and location clauses, equity restrictions, directed sourcing requirements, restricted market access or export quota requirements. Perhaps more obvious, however, has been the trend to default to blanket investment screening, where obligations under the AIA agreement are ostensibly adhered to in terms of non-published investment restrictions or closed sectors, but where all foreign investment is subject to a national approvals or permit approvals process. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore have each adopted this model, driven mostly by a desire to attract finite pools of extra-regional FDI and appear 'open for business'. This 'knock-onthe-door-and ask'-type policy approach has undoubtedly been highly successful and proven an attractive investment promotion device (OECD 2004: 93) . But to what degree it represents investment liberalisation is questionable. Investment screening, approvals processes, compliance requirements and conditionality clauses keep the state front and centre in overseeing foreign investment and able to shelter sectors from investment competition. What it does do, however, is give the appearance of investment liberalisation, if only by usurping the need to proscribe prohibitions or restrictions on investment. In the context of the AIA agreement, much of its claimed progress might thus be ascribed to mechanisms such as this. Two trends thus appear evident in the case of the impact of the AIA agreement. First, a combination of reclassification and redesignation has seen the migration of nominated sectors from the TELs to the SLs, where sectors previously 'closed' are now listed as 'open' but with stringent conditionality clauses that effectively render them protected. Second, policy changes in some ASEAN states towards a non-proscribed investment regime reliant on permit and approvals processes, and thus a default investment screening system, have removed the need for blanket investment prohibitions or 'closed' sectors, while leaving intact national discretion in investment screening. These two trends are significant since they betray a series of policy failures associated with the AIA agreement. Specifically, it highlights the failure of the AIA agreement to nurture the emergence of a more centralised investment governance regime mediated through regional authorities, and policy failure in terms of ASEAN's ability to coordinate standardised national investment provisions. Rather than restrain national discretionary investment screening or the imposition of conditionality clauses, the AIA agreement continues to display weaknesses that allow it to be outmanoeuvred by protectionist domestic political constituencies (see Table 4 for a summary of the AIA investment provisions). Despite the decade-long operation of the AIA agreement, its impact on investment liberalisation must thus be judged as problematic.
Intra-ASEAN investment patterns and the AIA agreement
Perhaps most disappointing and illustrative of the failure of the AIA agreement to fundamentally transform ASEAN's investment regime is the near stasis in the composition and distribution of intra-regional investment flows. Despite proclamations announcing reduced barriers to entry and ease of access for ASEAN nationals, intra-ASEAN investment flows remain largely unchanged, interspersed only by gyrations associated with the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, the tech-sector meltdown of 2001 and the impact of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in 2003Á4. Tables 5 and 6 , for example, reveal little evidence that the AIA agreement is leading to enhanced investment penetration among ASEAN states. Rather, two obvious and concerning trends appear evident. First is the predominance of inflows to Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Over the 10-year period from 1995 to 2004, for example, Malaysia averaged 22.86 percent of all intra-ASEAN FDI inflows, Singapore 24 percent and Thailand 22.9 percent. Just three of ASEAN's 10 member states, in other words, absorb the vast bulk (some two-thirds) of intraregional investment. Country-of-origin data in the case of intra-ASEAN FDI indicates an analogous pattern, with Singapore accounting for upwards of 62.6 percent of intra-ASEAN investment outflows between 1995 and 2003, while Malaysia averaged 16.3 percent. Just two of ASEAN's 10 member states thus accounted for nearly 80 percent of investment capital flowing into the rest of ASEAN.
These trends betray a number of challenges facing ASEAN which make the prospects for deeper investment liberalisation problematic. First, the highly concentrated and unequal distribution of intra-regional investment flows highlights the dissimilar nature of ASEAN's economies and the problem of market capture. Singapore, for example, with well-developed financial markets, efficient prudential capability and adept institutional and infrastructural capacity, is readily able to capture and intermediate the lion's share of the region's investment transactions, particularly in terms of capital-raising, merger and acquisitions, and allied financial, legal and consulting support services. Similarly, Malaysia and Thailand offer infrastructural and skills capacities that have made them highly attractive production, assembly and componentmanufacturing platforms in the region. For the vast majority of ASEAN states, Foreign direct investment and investment liberalisation in Asia 239 however, lower levels of economic development and poor levels of institutional and infrastructural capacity limit their ability to absorb investment flows on a scale that would significantly change current investment patterns. Second, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and, increasingly, Vietnam occupy similar developmental niches in terms of low value-added manufacturing, particularly in the electronic component sector, but also in terms of biofuels (palm oil in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia; automobile parts manufacture and assembly in the case of Thailand and Malaysia; and textiles and footwear in the case of Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand). Not only does this create competitive rather than cooperative regional dynamics, it also tends to bolster fiercely protectionist domestic political constituencies and competitive bidding wars through the provision of costly incentive systems for attracting and maintaining FDI. Competition for extra-regional FDI in ASEAN, for example, has witnessed what the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently described as a 'proliferation of incentives' to attract investment, which national governments use as a means of driving their development (OECD 2004: 93 ; see also the discussion in Jarvis and Welch 2011). Rather than seeing these abate or migrate to regional incentive schemes, as one might expect if ASEAN were maturating towards a regional investment bloc, they in fact appear to be deepening. Indonesia, for example, reinstated its incentive structures for FDI in the mid 1990s and has intensified them year-onyear, particularly after the Asian financial crisis. So extensive have these competitive incentive structures become that the OECD now estimates that the cost to ASEAN governments constitutes a significant proportion of their GDP. The estimated cost of Vietnam's incentives, for example, now runs to 0.7 percent of GDP, or some 5 percent of non-oil revenues; for the Philippines, it runs to some 1 percent of GDP, or US$2.5 billion of forgone taxation revenues year-on-year; and it is as much as 1.7 percent of GDP for Malaysia (OECD 2004: 99Á100) . Perhaps more obviously, these incentives are likely to persist as the competition not only between ASEAN states, but between ASEAN states and China for extra-regional FDI continues to intensify. Since the mid 1990s, for example, the investment patterns on which ASEAN's growth has been predicated have deteriorated. The result has been a systematic year-on-year decline in ASEAN's share of region-wide FDI: down from 50 percent in 1990 to between 17 and 19 percent in 2003, with China now absorbing upwards of 50 percent of all FDI into Asia (Jarvis 2004: 1) .
Third, highly unequal intra-regional investment flows have also tended to flame nationalistic suspicions and intra-regional rivalry. As a financially dominant player in intra-ASEAN investment, Singapore, for example, is frequently perceived as predatory. Recent investments by the investment arm of the Singapore government, Temasek Holdings, into Shin Corporation, Thailand's largest and dominant telecommunications company, majority owned by former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, for example, triggered an eventual military coup and the removal of Thaksin due to fears in part reflecting the sale of telecommunications assets to foreign regional interests (Kazmin 2008) . Similarly, Temasek's investment via ST Telemedia and Singapore Technologies and their purchase of a 41.9 percent stake in Indosat, Indonesia's satellite telecommunications company, met with Indonesian resentment and various legal manoeuvrings by the Indonesian anti-monopoly watchdog, which announced in November 2007 that it would move to impose sanctions and fine Temasek (Guerin 2007) .
Recent examples such as these highlight enduring problems that lessen, or at least render problematic, the prospects for engineering further agreements which would deepen investment liberalisation in ASEAN. The prolonged delay in the emergence of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which remains 'under negotiation' despite the successful negotiation and partial ratification of the ASEAN Charter, for example, is illustrative of the depth of investment nationalism that persists in the grouping.
7 Finding meaningful ways beyond such political stumbling blocks will be no easy feat.
Explaining modest success: ASEAN's investment regime
For an association that frequently proclaims its desire to emulate a European style of economic integration, ASEAN's achievements in the area of intraregional investment liberalisation have been modest (see, for example, Conde 2007) . How might we explain these outcomes? ASEAN, after all, outwardly appears to have all the necessary institutional apparatus and formalised agreements necessary to propel itself forward and achieve its stated ambitions. If regionalism reflects the amalgam of state interests and negotiated settlements between states, then ASEAN should be well on its way to a form of supranationalism. Clearly, it is not. But why?
The ASEANÁEuropean Union comparison has always been a point of contention, spurned both by ASEAN nationals as not suitable for their context, while also an ambition frequently lauded as the next stage of ASEAN's development. Explaining this contradiction perhaps involves less concentration on the state of state-to-state relations as it does on the subnational contexts that empower political elites and undergird their legitimacy. Many of ASEAN's states, for example, remain relatively fragile in the context of their political systems and the institutional structures that support them. The Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand have experienced recurrent periods of flux and contestation, making the states vulnerable to captive interests and powerful domestic political constituencies. Lao PDR, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam, by contrast, remain captured by specific sets of interests that reflect painful episodic events in state-making, decolonisation and the emergence of independence. In the case of ASEAN, it might thus be premature to approach the notion of regionalism as a set of matured states' interests that can be separated from domestic coalitions and subnational politics.
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Understanding the vexed outcomes of ASEAN's attempts at investment liberalisation might thus be better understood as a consequence of a complex and often messy amalgam of sectional interests, operating at both the national and subnational level, which historically have impacted the efficacy of ASEAN's attempts to construct a proactive form of regionalism. As Carroll and Sovacool (2010: 627Á28) This approach has important implications for how we understand and explain the ebbs and flows in ASEAN's evolution and its likely future directions. For Carroll and Sovacool (2010) , for example, ASEAN states need to be broken down into their complex parts. They are an amalgam of state security interests typical of traditional security-based conceptions of regionalism; state capital interests that reflect the extensive role of state-based economic enterprises among ASEAN nations (for example, the Perusahaan Listrik Negara [PLN] and Pertamina in Indonesia; Temasek Holdings and the Government Investment Corporation in Singapore; the Communications Authority of Thailand and the Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand; and Petronas in Malaysia); as well as powerful networks of domestic capital interests*for example, the ethnic Chinese business networks reflective of the Chinese diaspora throughout South-East Asia, and the ethno-political nationalisms evident in Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar.
As Carroll and Sovacool (2010: 627) note, this 'nest of particular influences . . . both drives and shapes grand regional initiatives', but in ways that both enhance and defend against regionalism or at least mould the emergence of regionalism in ways that are not exclusively defined by state-to-state interests or the primacy of a security problematic. Thus, the initial wave of investment guarantees associated with the AAPPI can be interpreted as part of the evolution of state-based enterprises among certain ASEAN states and their move into cross-border activities, where state-based capital interests pursued the AAPPI as much to defend their interests as to promote investment among ASEAN member states. Equally, the failure to more fully realise investment liberalisation represents the persistence of nascent ethno-national rivalries, which seek to champion indigenous national business. The Bumiputera ethno-nationalism evident in Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, for example, serves as an ardent point of reference against the successful Chinese diaspora and fears over the sublimation of these ethno-national identities in the face of Chinese business networks.
Indeed, in South-East Asia, the desire to promote Bumiputera business interests frequently produces disingenuous policy preferences, often corralling limited national resources for ethno-national agendas. Even in the case of capital-intensive sectors, for example, where the high cost and scarcity of domestic capital should presumably set in place the parameters for investment liberalisation and act as a point for convergence in ASEAN's investment coordination, there is little evidence that such developments are occurring. In the upstream energy sectors of ASEAN economies, for example, substantial year-on-year growth in demand for electricity and massive capital expenditure requirements have not translated into intra-regional liberalisation or the development of collective regional energy-financing mechanisms as a means of accelerating economic development through the roll-out of energy infrastructure. Indonesia, for example, continues to protect small independent power producers (IPPs) from external competition, lifting foreign ownership ceilings to 95 percent of registered capital, but limiting foreign IPPs to build projects of not less than 10,000 megawatts and in the process protecting PLN as the dominant supplier of electricity. 8 In the case of small IPPs, foreign investment is essentially restricted to passive investment positions requiring local partners, with these trends essentially repeated throughout ASEAN. Ethno-national capitalisms, in other words, both drive the development agendas of many South-East Asian states and also limit the emergence of a more robust regionalism. To the extent that ASEAN complements and helps bolster these ethno-national interests or manages the rivalries between them, its success has been guaranteed; to the extent that ASEAN has threatened such interests, its success has been modest or thwarted. The role and importance of subnational amalgams of interests in member states is thus one important element which explains the limited regionalism that ASEAN represents.
Where to next? The future of investment liberalisation in ASEAN Despite ASEAN's lacklustre achievements in intra-regional investment liberalisation, individual member states have nonetheless displayed a zeal for investment liberalisation, principally through a spate of non-regional bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This trend further belies the ethno-national rivalries in the region and the preference for engaging in non-regional bilateral initiatives as a means of securing competitive advantages for networks of domestic capital. In Thailand, for example, Thaksin's policy of turning stateowned enterprise into 'national champions', much as Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have, has seen Thailand and other ASEAN states more readily embrace BITs as an aggressive form of domestic capital sponsorship. Such preferences have dominated ASEAN member states' approaches to investment liberalisation, in the process circumscribing ASEAN's role as an investment bloc (see, for example, Greacen and Greacen 2004: 527 ; see also Jarvis 2010). As Table 7 highlights, all ASEAN states, with the exception of Myanmar and Brunei, have aggressively pursued bilateral investment agreements, with ASEAN's membership collectively signing 326 BITs as of 2007. As Table 7 Foreign direct investment and investment liberalisation in Asia 245 also demonstrates, however, the pattern of BITs lies beyond the region. Excluding Myanmar, which remains blacklisted among most Western states, and Cambodia and Lao PDR, where limited investment opportunities have constrained the engagement of extra-regional parties, the vast majority of BITs entered into by ASEAN members (some 85 percent or 278 BITs) have been with non-ASEAN states.
This trend is prescient of the likely direction of investment liberalisation in South-East Asia in the future*one potentially dominated by a 'spaghetti bowl' effect of overlapping BITs and bilateral trade agreements, which will collectively define the region's investment architecture. The implications of this are varied, but all of them are potentially significant for ASEAN. For example, with the failure of World Trade Organization talks in 2006 to realise further liberalisation in the global trade and investment system, states have been forced to place greater emphasis on bilateral initiatives as their principal tool for enhancing trade and investment facilitation. By their very nature, bilaterally negotiated agreements have proven to be relatively efficient, simple and effective instruments for achieving stated economic goals and, judging by their number, are now favoured instruments. The problem for ASEAN, of course, is that they effectively usurp or bypass regionally orchestrated agreements, such as the AIA agreement, and pose the risk of marginalising ASEAN as the region's most proactive and central instrument for securing interstate economic cooperation and mutual welfare gains. To put it another way, BITs, because they are targeted and nested in mutually defined interests, appear to produce deeper liberalisation measures and superior welfare effects than has been the case with the AIA agreement. This, after all, would explain why some ASEAN states have pursued BITs with other ASEAN states, even in the presence of the AIA agreement.
Further, the pursuit of BITs by ASEAN states might also be assessed in terms of the superior dispute resolution procedures they typically contain. Most BITs The APEDSM, in other words, is not strictly a legal-based instrument, but reverts to economic officials and political organs who can disregard the recommendations of the appointed adjudication panel. This points to shortcomings in the AIA agreement, and explains the prevalence and deepening web of BITs entered into by ASEAN member states. It also points to a further irony in the liberalisation process in ASEAN*that much, if not most, is being driven by instruments and mechanisms external to the association rather than the various agreements constructed by the association. BITs and bilateral trade agreements, for example, point to much deeper levels of penetration into protectionist practices than those achieved by the AIA agreement or the AAPPI. In the case of tariff liberalisation, for example, one commentator went so far as to note that:
In practice AFTA [the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement] and its core agreements (on tariff, investment and services) have so far merely given the appearance of political cooperation on economic liberalization policy changes that were happening anyway. Also, because of the depth of unilateral liberalization in ASEAN countries, there do not appear to have been any significant tariff or investor benefits for being an ASEAN member as opposed to a non-ASEAN member. (quoted in Pagaduan-Araullo 2007) Paradoxically, then, many of the standards associated with liberalisation highlighted at the outset of this article*particularly, national discretionary autonomy in relation to investment screening and conditionality provisions, transparency in respect of national investment regimes and codification of regulatory standards governing investment-related provisions*are being modForeign direct investment and investment liberalisation in Asia 247 erated more so by the outcomes of bilateral initiatives than by ASEAN-based ones. The danger, of course, is that since the majority of these bilateral agreements reside with countries external to the region, the investment provisions and patterns they create will skew relationships in ways that do not necessarily complement regional ideals or the longer-terms goals of ASEAN economic integration. ASEAN, in a sense, is thus being outclassed and outmanoeuvred, and is in danger of becoming outdated if renewed commitment to investment liberalisation is not forthcoming. Making ASEAN relevant to investment liberalisation and to enhancing investment volumes across its membership base will require considerably more effort than has thus far been displayed. Much, of course, depends on the way in which the long awaited implementation of the ACIA (signed in 2009) is mediated in the region and used to support investment liberalization. It might, however, be premature and overly optimistic to assume that the ACIA will prove to be the panacea to reinvigorating investment liberalisation in ASEAN. As Walter Lohman and Anthony B. Kim note:
ASEAN's ambition is clear, its record in implementing agreements to facilitate economic integration is spotty, and its commitment to economic freedom is subpar. ASEAN requires a resolution of vision to get to ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. It also needs tools and resources to manage the undertaking effectively. (Lohman and Kim 2008: 12) Historically, ASEAN has been long on talk and short on concrete deliverables. Singapore's former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Professor S. Jayakumar, for example, noted that ASEAN has at times been widely perceived to be 'ineffective', and at various junctures in danger of being marginalised by its dialogue partners and international investors alike (quoted in Tay et al. 2001: ix) .
Transforming ASEAN beyond what Hadi Soesastro (2001: 308) described as a 'diplomatic community' into a true economic community is, of course, the intent behind recent political initiatives and the newly minted ASEAN Charter. The ambitions are, again, clear and concisely articulated. Whether, however, these ambitions materialise remains the preserve of individual member states and of their commitment to enhancing the supranational capabilities of ASEAN. With a secretariat that is only 210 people strong, resource capabilities well beneath those required to service a community of some 600 million people and an ambitious agenda for economic integration, it is obvious that considerably more effort, resources and political commitment will be required in the coming years. 
